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Panagariya and Schiff are particularly interested  becomes a Stackelberg leader, its profits rise and
in evaluating the concern that efficiency or  those of the others fall.  But the rise in the
policv-induced changes in the supply of exports  Stackelberg leader's profit is lower than the
of primary commodities - including cocoa,  decline in the other countries'  profits, so total
coffee, and tea - may lead to such a large  profits decline.
decline in the prices of those commodities that
export revenues and incomes of the exporting  They also find that even if countries choose
countries actually decline.  In this paper, they  taxes or quotas optimally, growth in a country
focus on the implications of quantitative restric-  can lead to a decline in the combined real
tions.  income of the exporting countries.
They compare the implications of optimal  Their simulations cast doubt on the hypoth-
Nashi  quotas and taxes when two or more coun-  esis analysts often advance that a market with
trics compete against each other in the world  five or more players can be regarded as roughly
market.  perfectly competitive.  If this hypothesis were
valid for policy formulation in the cocoa market,
They find that the outcome under taxes is  the optimal export taxes would be about zero.
Iess restrictive than under quotas - but that the  But Panagariya's and Schiff's results indicate
countries' profits are higher under quotas than  that the outcome of the nine-country game is far
under taxes.  from the zero-tax solution.  So the optimal taxes
exceed 10 percent for the largest producers (C6te
In simulations undertaken for the world  d'lvoire,  Ghana, and Brazil) in the Nash-tax
cocoa market, they find that for most countries  game and in all countries except Indonesia and
optimal Nash taxes yield lower profits than the  Oceania in the Nash and Stackelberg quantity
initial taxes or quotas.  If one of the countries  games.
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*  This paper is  A  part of the World Bank research project "Commodity  Exports and
Real Incomes in Africa" (RPO 676-70). We thank Francois Bourguignon, Jaime de Melo,
Peter Lloyd, Nicholas Stern, and Alan Winters for helpful comments, and Lili Liu for
excellent research  assistance.This paper is part of an ongoing research effort aimed at analyzing  the interactions  among
commodity  exports, real incomes and trade policies.  We are particularly interested  in evaluating  the
concern that efficiency  or policy induced changes  in the supply of exports of primary commodities
may lead to such a large decline in the prices of the latter that export revenues and incomes of the
exporting countries  actually decline.'  The commodities  in question include cocoa, coffee, and tea.
The possibility of income and revenue loss arises principally  because the world demand for
primary commodities  is relatively inelastic. The natral  instrument the exporting countries can
employ  to counteract  this problem is trade policy.  In doing so one must recognize, however, that
since the exporting countries are neither small nor mnopolies in the world markets, their policies are
i-aterdepandent.  Because  the conventional  trade models  rely on one of these two extremes, they fail to
capture the interdependence  of policies central to the problem under consideration.
In our recent work, we have analyzed in detail the implications  of interdependence  among
countries  when the policy instrument is an export tax.  Thus, in Panagariya and Schiff (1991a), we
derive Nash optimum taxes in a 10-country  model of the world cocoa market.  In our simulations,  we
find that compared to the initial equilibrium,  tax competition  implicit in Nash behavior leads to a loss
in real income for 8 out of 9 exporting countries. 2 In Panagariya and Schiff (1991b), we compare
income and revenue maximizing  Nash taxes.  A key result in this paper is that under plausible
circumstances,  revenue maximizing  Nash taxes can yield higher levels of income than income
maximizing  Nash taxes.  For example, in the symmetric  case, income-maximizing  Nash taxes are
lower than income-maximizing  cooperative  taxes and generate a lower level of income than the latter.
'See Panagariya and Schiff (1991a)  for a documentation  of the concerns raised recently. Earlier
concerns  or, these lines had led the World Bank in 1968  to adopt guidelines which severely restricted
lending  for projects aimed at output expansion  of the commodities  in question.
2As noted in the paper, this and other findings are to be viewed as preliminary. The simulations
are based on rough and ready estimates  of demand and supply.  A more thorough econometric
analysis is planned for the fiture.Beause  revenue-maximizing  Nash taxes are larger than income-maximizing  Nash taxes, they are
likely to be closer to the income-maximizing  cooperative  taxes.
In the present paper, we conminue  this line of research and focus on the implications  of
quantitative  restrictions. We derive the equilibrium  which will result if exporting countries set their
export quotas optimally  taking the quantities  of exports of other countries as given.  We compare tuis
equilibrium  with the one which obtains when countries  use export taxes as the policy instruments.
We also perform a number of simulations  assuming  that countries choose their export quotas
optimally in the Nash-Cournot  fashion.
We may note at the outset that the equivalence  between export quotas and export taxes
discussed  in the standard trade theory literature (e.g., Bhagwati 1969) will break down in the present
context.  We know from the recent literature on oligopoly and trade (e.g., Eaton and Grossman 1986)
that the equilibria based on price and quantity  games exhibit very different properties.  The essential
point in the present context is that starting at a given initial quantity of the rival's exports, the excess
demand curve facing a country is more elastic when the rival imposes an export tax rather than an
export quota. 3
In Section 2, we present a simple demand and supply model and, borrowing from the
literature on oligopoly  and trade, draw a contrast between  equilibria under Nash-Bertrand  and Nash-
Cournot behavior.  In the former case, countrieE  choose their export taxes optinally taking the other
countries' tax rates as given.  In the latter case, they choose export quotas optimally. We also
compare the effects of a movement  to Stackelberg  behavior by one or more countries under the tax
and quota games.  Finally, we employ the model to provide an interpretation  of the fallacy of
composition  in the present case.
'We may also note in passing that the nature of our problem is different from that in the
conventional  retaliation  literature a la Johnson (1954), Rodriguez  (1974) and Tower (1975).  In our
paper, two or more countries impose  restrictions on goods going to the rest of the world.  By
conrast, in the literature just cited, two countries restrict exports to each 2Xr.
2In Section 3, we apply the model to the world cocoa market and derive numerically the
optimal  taxes and quotas under various behavioral  assumptions. We find that the fallacy of
composition  takes a bigger bite under the Bertrand  than under the Counot game.  Implicit tax rates
under the quota game are substantially  higher  than under the tax game. The associated profits are
aiso higher under the quota game.  Our simulations  for a productivity  increase show that it is possible
for growth to result in an overall decline in income even if countries choose their taxes or quotas
optimally.
In Section  4, we discuss some important  limitations  of our paper and suggest directions for
future research.  Sununary and conclusions  are provided in Section 5.
2.  The Model
We employ a simple demand-supply  model.  All functions  are assumed to have a linear form.
The world demand is represented by
1)  Q -A-BP  A, B  - 0
where P is the price paid by buyers in the world market.  Quantity  supplied b- country i is written
2)  q  = a,  1 bipi  i = 1, 2... n.
where p 1 is the price received by sellers.  Note that the we denote the variables and parameters  on the
supply side by lower case letters.  The difference  between P and p 1 is accounted for by a quota
premium. We denote the quota premium in country i  as a proportion  of the world price by e,.
Thus,
3)  Pe = (1 -el)P  i=1,2,...n
We assume that the government  captures the quota premium through either a competitive  auction of
export licenses, an explicit tax at rate el, or by marketing  the product itself.
3The excess  demand  facing  country  j  may  be written
4)  Qj = Q-Eq,  n
=  (A  -i  -q  BP
I  let  ) 
X As-BP
Note  that j  in the last equality  is a function  of the sum  of the total  quantity  supplied  by country  j 's
rivals  and  hence,  in the absence  of quotas,  of the world  price.
We assume  that exporters  do not consume  the good  and importers  do not produce  it.  This
assumption  is valid  for cocoa. Each  country  behaves  like  a Cournot  oligopolist.  That is to say, each
country  maxinizes  its profits  taking  the exports  of the other countries  as given. Therefore,  equation
(4) represents  the perceived  demand  curve  of country  j . The corresponding  marginal  revenue  may
be written
5)  MR, = -(A 1 -2Q)  j  1,2,...n
The marginal  cost  of production  is given  by (2). Thus,
6)  Cj =  p  =  1 (q-a,)  j  =  1, 2,...n
At a profit  maximizing  equilibrium,  we have MR, = MC, and Qj = q 1. The latter  equality  simply
says  that  the quantity  demanded  must  equal  quantity  supplied  for country  j.  Making  use of these
equalities,  (5) and  (6) lead  to
hAj  +aB
= I,...n.
4Embedded  in (7) are n linear equations in qj, ... q.  We can solve these equations for the  n
equilibrium  quantities. Once we have these quantities,  equations  (l)-(3) can be used to obtain
P, pi and el.  This is the approach  taken in the simulations  presented in the next section.
The wndel outlined above is a standard  Nash-Cournot  model.  Therefore, we do not need to
provide an elaborate discussion  of its properties. However, it is useful to state briefly some of the
properties relevant to the specific problem we are interested  in.  For this purpose, we concentrate  on
the duopoly case.
From (7), it is clear that the reaction  functions  will be linear in the  (ql,  q2) space in the
duopoly case.  In the symmetric  case, we have a1 = a2 a  a  and  b,  = b2 m b and the equilibrium  is
characterized  by q 1 = q2. In Figure 1 point C, lying  on the 454-line (not shown) through the origin,
represents  the Cournot equilibrium.
The isoprofit  curves for country 1 will be stricdy concave  to the horizontal axis with a slope
equal to 0 at the point where they intersect  the reaction  curve, RX  R 1 (e.g., see Eaton and Grossman
1986). Intuitively, for a given value of q2, the corresponding  point on R,R, gives the country's best
response.  Holding q2 fixed, if the country moves away in either direction  from this best-response
output, its profits decline.  In order to restore profits to the original level, we must reduce q 2 as this
will lead to a higher world price.  Hence, the isoprofit  curves must be flat at the point of intersection
with RAR 1.
As we move down on R,R,, profits of country I rise.  This movement  is associated with
lower values of q2 and hence increased market power for country 1.  Indeed, at q 2 = 0, country I
becomes  the monopolist  in the market.  Two isoprofit curves, labeled 7ic 71  and  7c 1  I,  are shown in
Figure 1.
5Country 2's isoprofit  curves (not shown in Figure 1) are strictly concave to the vertical axis
and have a slope equal to infinity at the points of intersection  with RR2 . Country 2's profits rise as
we move up along R2R2. At point M 2 where q 1 - 0, country 2 becomes the monopolist in the world
market.
As noted earlier, Cournot equilibrium  is given by point C in Figure 1. We know from
oligopoly literature that one of the two countries  could improve its profits position by behaving as a
Stackelberg  leader.  Thus, if country 1 is to behave as the leader, it will export at point S.  As
expected, its profits will be higher and the follower's profits lower at S than at C.
This result is robust to at least two modifications. First, if the countries are of a different
size, Stackelberg  equilibrium continues  to be superior for the leader and inferior for the follower.
For example, an increase in a,  shifts R1R, to the right in a parallel fashion but does not change  the
qualitative  relationship  between  Cournot and Stackelberg  equilibria.
Second, addition of more countries leaves the above result unchanged. Thus, if there are  n
countries and one of them acts as a Stackelberg  leader, profits and output of that country ale higher
and those of the other countries lower than at Cournot equilibrium. Essentially,  as a Cournot player,
each country ignores  the fact that an expansion  of output by it causes the competitors  to contract  their
output.  This pessimistic  view leads the country  to produce  too little relative to Stackelberg
equilibrium  where it does take into account the rivals' response.
An interesting  exception  to the above result may arise when we allow a g£=,  of countries  to
act as Stackelberg  leaders. Thus, in the linear, symmetric  case, if there are 3 players in all and 2 of
them jointly become leaders, they produce less than when they act independently  as Cournot players.
In this case, Stackelberg  equilibrium  yields a higher profit than Cournot equilibrium even for the
follower. This result can be explained  in two steps.  In the first step, suppose the two countries act
jointly as a single Nash player.  Their combined  output in this case will be less than when they act
6independently. In the second step, we let the two countries act jointly as Stickelberg leader.  This
leads to an expansion  of output.  But this expansion  is less than the contraction in the first step.
Thus, the net effect of turning the two countries from independent  Nash players to joint Stackelberg
leader is a contraction  of output.  This allows the third country  to expand its output and profits.'
Tlese results contrast sharply with the results obtained from Bertrand competition. Thus, as
discussed in Panagariya and Schiff (199  lb) in detail, if countries base their decisions  taking each
other's export taxes as given, reaction functions  in the tax rates space are positively sloped.  Thus,
contrary to the situation depicted in Figure 1, an increased restriction  on exports via a higher export
tax by the rival causes a country to raise its own export tax.  In this setting, it is easy to show that
Stackelberg  equilibrium is associated with a greater restriction  on exports by both the leader and the
follower  even in a two player game.  More interestingly,  in the symmetric  case, at a Stackelberg
equilibrium,  profits of the follower  are larger than of the leader! This is because starting from Nash
equilibrium, the follower increases  his tax by less and hence has a larger market share than the
leader.  These r"sults cannot be obtained when countries  choose export quotas strategically.
Another subtle but interesting  difference between  the two policy instruments is that with taxes,
Stackelberg  equilibrium is more restrictive than Nash equilibrium  while with quotas the opposite  is
true.  Thus with taxes, the world price at Stackelberg  equilibrium  is higher than at Nash equilibrium.
But with quotas, the world price is lower at Stackelberg  equilibrium  than at Nash equilibrium. This
is because in Figure 1, the increase in the leader's output at S relative to C is larger than the
reduction in the output of the follower. Hence, joint profits are lower under Stackelberg  than under
Nash when countries  choose quotas strategically,  with losses to the follower  larger than the gains to
the leader.
Before we proceed to the simulation  results of the cocoa market, we find it useful to provide
an interpretation  of the fallacy of composition  with the help of Figure 2 which is a modification  of
'In the general case with n players, the outcome depends on the number of players who jointly
become Stackelberg  leaders relis  to those who remain Nash followers.
7Figure 1.  We know that the joint profits of the two countries  will be maximized  somewhere  on the
segment  OC of the 45°-line.  Essentially,  the output of each country must be less at the joint-profit
maximizing  equilibrium  than at Coumot equilibrium, C.  Let J  represent the point of joint-profit
maximization. Suppose  now that the current exports of the two cmtantries  happen to be at point A.
From A, each country can increase its profits by expanding  exports towards its reaction function
provided the other country keeps its exports at the level indicated  by A.  However, if hpIh countries
expand their exports, they will find themselves  at point B and make I1  profits than at A.  This is the
essence  of the fallacy of composition.
A final telated point to note is that in the example  shown in Figure 2, if the countries awe
initially at B and move simultaneously  assuming  that the other country will maintain its current
output, both countries will r  their exports and icse  their profits.  To the extent that an
equilibrium  is reached only at C and not J, however, an element of the fallacy of composition
remains.  That is to say, even at the Nash-Cournot  equilibrium,  countries wind up exporting too much
relative to their joint profit maximization  levels.
3.  SimuAlaion  Results
We note at the outset that there are important  empirical  and theoretical  limitations of the
simulations  reported below. Although  we will discuss  these limitations  in detail in Section 4, we wish
to caution at the outset that the results reported below should be considered  tentative.
Table I provides the information  on the initial  equilibrium. The first five columns with
numbers are self t  - ,anatory.S The sixth and seventh column are derived from the output, price and
5Some small producers, other than the nine appearing  in Table 1, have been excluded from the
analysis. The implicit assumption  is that their supply is fixed and does not respond to the world
prices.
8elasticity. The elasticities  were estimated  by their authors assuming constant-elasticity  functions. We
linparized  these functions around the price and quantity shown in Tabl * I and applied the elasticity
estimates  to obtain the slope and intercept  shown .n the last two columns. The elasticity  of demand in
the world market used in the simulations is 0.4.  Given the price and quantity in 1986, this yields an
intercept  of 12286.3 Metric Tons and a s'ope of -315.6 Metric Tons per U.S. dollar.
The elasticities  in Table I are diverse and require some explanation. For traditional, long-
established  producers such as Brazil, CBte  d'lvoire, Ghana and Nigeria, elasticities are low while for
more recent entrants such as Malaysia  and Indonesia  they are high.  This may be because traditional
producers have only limited  possibilities  with respect to substitution  into and out of other crops.  In
addition, for output expansion,  these countries  do not have suitable land available at the margin. By
contrast, Malaysia  and Indonesia  have been able to take advantage  of vast amiounts  of suitable virgin
l2qd.  We hope to shed more light on this issue in our future work where we will attempt a careful
estimation  of supply elasticities  using flexible functional  forms.
Using the information  in Table 1, we can calculate  what we call the "Actual" equilibrium. By
virtue of the calibration  procedure, this equilibrium  is the same as that in Table 1.  In Table 2, we
show the profits associated  with this equilibrium  in column  4.  These profits include the producers'
surplus and tax revenues. Table 2 also provides the output and profits if all restrictions on exports
are renmoved,  i.e., if the marginal  cos. is equated to the world price.  Not surprisingly, a total
removal of export restrictions lowers the world price (from $2,070 to $1,562 per metric ton) and
benefits the importers of cocoa.  In principle, countries which tax exports too heavily can experience
an improvement  in welfare by a movement  to free trade but this does not happen in our simulations.
Only Ghana which taxed exports in 1982  at the rate of 70% of the wom  price experiences  more or
less no change in profits.  All other countries  experience significant  losses from a movemrent  to the
free trade equilibrium.
9In Tables 3-5, we present several simulations. These include:
1.  Each country takes the export taxes of its competitors  as given and chooses its own tax rate
optimally. This is referred to as Nash (M) game in Tables 3-5 and was analyzed in detail in
Panagariya  and Schiff (1991a).
2.  Each country  takes the export quantities  of the competitors  as given and chooses its own
export quantity optimally. This is referred to as Nash (Q) game in Tables 3-5.
3.  TMe  largest exporter, Cote d'Ivoire, is Stackelberg  leader and the other countries are
followers. The countries choose export quantities  and play what we call Stackelberg  (Q)
game in Tables 3-5.
4.  Ghana's supply curve shifts to the ri,ht by 100,000  Metric Tons.  We simulate  the effects of
this change both under initial quotas and Nash tax and quantity  games.
5.  Malaysia's supply curve shifts to the right by 100,000  Metric Tons.  As in (4), we simulate
effects of this change both under initial export quotas and Nash tax and quantity games.
In the following, we discuss each of these simulations  in detail and where relevant compare
them to each other or to the initial equilibrium.
3.1  The Nash  Tax Gam:  In this simulation,  each country chooses its export tax optimally  taking the
taxes of other countries as given.  As shown in columns I and 2 of Table 3, the changes  from the
initial equilibrium  are rather dramatic.  With the exception  of the countries with 0 initial tax and Cote
d'Ivoire, Nash taxes for all countries are substantially  below the actual levels.  For Ghana, Cameroon
and Nigeria, the ratio of actual to Nash taxes is especially  high at 3, 5 and 8, respectively. Under
Nash behavior, countries ignore the fact that a tax reduction by them leads the competitors  to do the
same and, as a result, act aggressively  to capture a larger share of the market.  Given a relatively
steep world-demand  curve, this behavior is accompanied  by a sharp decline in the price and only a
10limited  expansion  of the quantity  sold. Thus,  the decline  in the price from the initial  equilibrium  is
14.1%  while  the increase  in quantity  is only  5.6%.
The effects  of these  changes  in taxes,  the world  price  and total  quantity  are reflected  in the
changes  in real incomes  defined  as the tax revenue  plus  producers'  surplus  and referred  to as profits
in Tables 2-5.  Of the nine countries, only Ghana's real income (profit) is higher in the Nash-tax
equilibrium  than initially. All  the other countries  experience  a lower  profit! Africa  as a whole  also
experiences  a lower  profit  in the Nash-tax  equilibrium  than  initially.
Several  African  countries  and  Africa  as a whole  do gain  in terms  of output  share. The total
African  output  rises  by 19.6%  yielding  a 71.5%  share  in the world  market. The latter  is higher  than
the corresponding  share  at tie initial  equilibrium  bv 8.3 percentage  points. Ghana  makes  the biggest
gain  in output:  from 219,0(0 rv.T. to 347,000  M.T.  ITis 58% increase  in output  is the result  of
reduction  in the tax rate from 70%  to 19.5%  and  the fact  that Ghana  enjoys  a cost  advantage  relative
to its competitors.
Tax revenues  for Ecuador,  Malaysia,  Indonesia  and  Oceania  are 0 in the initial  equilibrium
due  to no taxation. For these  countries,  revenues  in the Nash-tax  equilibrium  are obviously  higher.
For all the remaining  countries  revenues  decline,  however,  due to a reduction  in the tax rate  and
limited  expansion  of quantity. It is striking  that even  Ghana  which  gains  substantially  in terms  of
output  expansion  loses  on account  of tax revenue.
3.2  xort: Quotas The Nash,  Quantity  Game  Next,  we consider  the case  when  the countries  play  a
Nash-Cournot  game  and  set export  quotas  optimally,  taking  the competitors'  export  quotas  as given.
The result  in this case,  shown  in columns  numbered  3 in Table  3, stand  in sharp contrast  to those  in
the previous  case. Most  importantly,  countries  are far more  restrictive  under  the quota  game  than
under  the tax game. Remarkably,  all countries  except  Cote  d'Ivoire  experience  a higher  real income
(profits)  in this case  than  at the initial  equilibrium.
11It is most interesting  to compare  the equilibria  based  on the tax and quota  games. Broadly
speaking,  the Nash-tax  outcome  is less  restrictive  and Nash-quantity  outcome  more  restrictive  than  the
initial  equilibrium.  In terms  of Figure  2, assuming  symmetry,  we can imagine  that  the initial
equilibrium  corresponds  to B, the Nash-tax  outcome  to a point  farther  out along  OB and the Nash-
quantity  outcome  to C.
Comparing  columns  (2) and (3) under  the heading  "Tax  Rates"  in Table  3, we note  that the
implicit  tax rates  under  the quota  game  are consistenly  higher  than  those  under  the tax game. This
result  is related  to the earlier  observation  (due  to Eaton  and Grossman  1986)  that in considering  tax
reductions  under  the tax game  countries  are 'too optimistic"  while  in considering  output  expansion
under  the quota  game  they  are "too  pessimistic."  In the former  case, a tax reduction  by a country  is
matched  by rivals  but this is ignored  by the country. In the latter  case,  rivals respond  to a quantity
expansion  by quantity  £  aLii  and the country  ignores  it while  choosing  its own  optimal  level  of
exports.
As expected,  the largest  exporters  - Cote  d'Ivoire  and Ghana  - are most restrictive  under
both  tax and quantity  games. Compared  to the initial  tax rate, Cote  d'Ivoire's tax rate is
approximately  the same  under  Nash  tax game  but twice  as high  under  the quantity  game. In each
case,  its output  is lower  than  the initial  output. In the former  case, the country  loses  market  share
due to tax competition,  especially  to Ghana. In the latter  case, it also loses  the market  due to a very
high  implicit  export  tax of its own.
The restrictive  effect  under  the quota  game  is so strong  that  the world  price Li= by 7.9%
relative  to its level  in the initial  equilibrium.  This price  increase  is the result  of a greater  exploitaion
of monopoly  power  by the exporting  countries. Combined  profits  of the countries  rise by 13%.
Compared  to Nash-tax  equilibrium,  the increase  in profits  is even  larger  (32.1%). Interestingly,  the
quantity  game  equilibrium  is associated  with  higher  profits  for every  country  than  the tax-game
equilibrium.
12Tax revenues  follow the same essential  pattern as profits.  The major exception is Nigeria
which experiences  a decline in revenues  under both games relative to the initial equilibrium. This is
due to the fact that Nigeria's initial  tax rate at 50% seems to be aimed primarily at raising revenue
regardless  of real income considerations.
3.3 Stcklbep-  t  Game:  In columns  numbered  4 in Table 3, we show the outcome under the
assumption.  that Cozte  01vofoir. (  e;s  ac a Stackelbeg leader  in a quantity game.  The main result here is
that Cote d'lvoire benefits, relative to the Nash-quantity  game, at the expense of all other countries.
Cote d'lvoire's exports expand  by more than the combined  contraction  of exports by the followers.
The world price falls relative to the Nash-quantity  game and Cote d'Ivoire's profits rise.  Profits of
the followers decline across the board.
We may note that these results are qualitatively  different from those obtained in a Stackelberg-
tax game.  In this latter case, both the leader and followers increase restriction on exports and are
better off relative to the Nash-tax game in terms of profits.
3.4  A Shift in Ghana's SuDPly  Curve:  In Table 4, we report the effects of a parallel, rightward  shift
of 100,000  M.T. in Ghana's supply curve under various assumptions  about trade policy.  Differences
among  the various cases within  this set of simulations  are similar to those in the original case (Table
3).  Therefore, we do not discuss this comparison; instead, we focus on a comparison  of each case
with the corresponding  case in Table 3; i.e., on the comparative  static effect under each equilibrium
concept.
Under no tax-policy  response (i.e., keeping the tax rates at their initial level), the shift
benefits Ghana and hurts all the other countries. This is as expected  since the shift represents an
exogenous  productivity  increase in Ghana and is associated  with a decline in the world price of cocoa.
13Interestingly,  the overall gain in profits is only 1.8%; a substantial  part of Ghana's gains in offset by
losses in other countries.
Under Nash-tax equilibrium,  the story is more or less similar in that Ghana continues  to gain
while  other countries lose.  The world price declines but by much smaller magnitude  than under
actual  taxes.  As a result, the percentage  gain in total profits is larger.  However, if we compare the
post-shock  lgv:  of profits under actual and Nash taxes (Table 4, bottom line, columns 1 and 2), we
find that profits are lower in the latter case. The shift in Ghana's supply curve is accompanied  by an
increase in optimal  Nash taxes in most but not all countries. Thus, interestingly, the tax rates in
Cameroon, Malaysia, and Indonesia  decline slightly.
Finally, the results under the Nash-quantity  game follow a similar pattern.  Ghana's profits
increase  while those of the other countries decline. Overall profits rise, although by a very small
amount.
3i. a.Shif-l.in- M21avsia's  l  C  e:  The effects of a shift in Malaysia supply curve are shown
in Table 5.  In the case of existing taxes, the effects are identical to those in the previous simulation
for all countries except Ghana and Malaysia. World profits are lower in the present case than when
Ghana's supply curve shifts.  The reason is that in the present case a high cost producer, Malaysia,
expands output while in the other case a low cost producer, Ghana, expands output.
Perhaps the most interesting  result in the present case is that the increase in Malaysia's
productivity  leads to a decing in the total profits under all regimes. Thus, in spite of the fact that
countries adjust the taxes and quantities  optimally, they fail to escape a decline in their combined  real
incomes.
14We now describe some of the limitations  of our analysis which future research must attempt
to overcome. We consider  first the empirical  limitations and then theoretical issues.
Information on which our simulatons are based does not relate to a single year.  For
example, elasticity estimates  have been drawn from various studies and do not relate to the same time
period.  Prices and quantities  which form the basis of the initial, calibrated equilibrium  relae to 1986
while tax rates are from the year 1982 (1983 in the case of Brazil).  The simulations also suffer from
the limitation  that the demand and supply functions  are assumed to be linear.  In models  of oligopoly,
results may be more sensitive  to fuiictional  forms than in models  based on perfect competition. In
particular, along a linear demand curve, the elasticity of demand declines with price.  This property
does not hold in general and under plausible circumstances,  the opposite may happen. In this
eventuality,  some of the qualitative  conclusions  discussed in Section 2 may not hold.  In future work,
we plan to base our simulations  on a more careful econometric  analysis  allowing for flexible
functional  forms.
On the theoretical  front, it is of utmost importance  to recognize  the implications  of the partial
equilibrium  nature of our analysis. The partial equilibrium  framework, employed in a large number
of recent simulation  studies of optimal policies for oligopoly industries,  relies on the assumption  that
the sector under study is not sufficiently  large to affect the prices in the rest of the economy.
However, if the sector is large enough to warrant the analysis  of optimal  policies, it is likely to be
large enough to influence  the rest of the economy. This means that the general equilibrium  aspects  of
the present problem, and presumably  of the various oligopoly studies, could be potentially important.
The key problem which deserves emphasizing  is that if the rest of the economy is distorted,
moving one sector in isolation  towards its partial-equilibrium  optimum is not necessarily welfare
improving. The most serious implication  of this point for our analysis  is that within the standard
Walrasian  model with balanced  trade, restrictions on imports act as substitutes  for restrictions on
15exports via the Lermer  Symmetry  theorem.  Indeed, if import restrictions are sufficiently  high and the
Lerner Symmetry  holds, it may be optimal to impose no restrictions on exports or even subsidize
them.
This point raises the natural question  as to whether the current levels of import restrictions in
some of the cocoa exporting countries  are sufficiently  high that these countries  will benefit from
further reductions in export taxes even if such reductions are carried out by all of them jointly.
Given the high levels of import restrictions in many of these countries, this might seem highly
plausible.  Yet, the example of the International  Coffee Agreement (ICA) suggests  that the issue is
more complicated. Despite  the fact that some of the coffee exporting countries have had a highly
restrictive import regime, the conventional  wisdom is that the ICA was beneficial for coffee-exporting
countries. Indeed, the general consensus  appears to be that the ICA resulted in substantial transfers in
real incomes from coffee importing  to coffee exporting  countries.
A resolution of these conflicting  observations  may lie in the possibility  that the assumptions
required for the validity of the Lerner Symmetry  theorem fail to obtain in reality.  The theorem
requires that trade balance be fixed exogenously  and is derived from a model in which the nominal
exchange rate plays no role even in the presence  of nontraded goods. If trade balance is endogenous
and is affected  by nominal devaluation,  however, the symmetry will break down.  A 10 percent
devaluation  is equivalent  to a 10 percent import tariff combined  with a 10 percent export subsidy. If
the Lerner Symmetry  theorem is valid, the tax and subsidy  should neutralize each other, implying
neutrality  of the exchange rate.  Yet, in most practical situations, it is difficult  to imagine  that the
nominal exchange  rate has no effect on the economy.
If one believes that the exchange rate matters, an import tariff is likely to have a smaller
effect on exports than an equivalent  expor tax.  The reason is that in the former case, resources will
be drawn out of the nontradable  sector as well as the exportable  sector.  By contrast, in the latter
case, the exportable  sector will lose resources to the importable  as well as the nontradable  sector.
16This point blunts somewhat  the force of the Lemer Symmetry argument but the broader proposition
that general equUibrium  effects may be important  for our analysis remains valid.  Future research
must take this factor into account.
We now turn back to the results of our paper.  We have compared the implications  of optimal
Nash taxes and quotas in a setting when two or more countries compete  against each other in the
world market.  We have found that the outcome under taxes is less restrictive than under quotas.
However, profits of the countries  are higher under quotas than those under taxes.  In the simulations
undertaken  for the world cocoa market, we find that for most countries, optimal Nash taxes yield
lower profits and optimal Nash quotas yield higher profits than the initial taxes or quotas.  We have
also seen that if one of the countries  becomes a Stackelberg  leader, its profits rise and those of the
others fall.  The rise in the former's profit is lower, however, than the decline in the latter's profits.
Thus, total profits decline. Finally, we have found that even if countries  choose taxes or quotas
optimally. growth in a country  can lead to a decline ir, the combined  real income of the exporting
countries.
In conclusion,  we note that the simulations  in this paper cast doubt on the hypothesis,
advanced  frequently by analysts, that a market characterized  by five or more players can be regarded
as approximately  perfectly competitive. If this hypothesis were valid for policy formulation  in cocoa
market, the optimal export taxes would be approximately  zero.  Our results indicate, however, that
the outcome of the nine-country  game is far from the zero-tax solution. Thus, the optimal taxes
exceed 10 percent for the largest producers (Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Brazil) in the Nash-tax game
and in all countries except Indonesia  and Oceania in the Nash and Stackelberg  quantity games.
17Akiyama,  T. and A. Bowers. (1984). "Supply  Response  of Cocoa in Major Producing Countries,"
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18Table 1: Basic Data
output  Output Share  Export  Tax'  |  Domestic  Price  |  Intercept
(OOOMT)  (%)  J  (%)  (US$/MT)  ElasticieyW  Sloped  (ODOMT)
Cote d'lvoire  585  35.8  25.1  1550  1.15  |  .q 4  -87.7
Ghana  219  13.4  70.0  621  0.71  0.250  63.5
Cameroon  118  7.2  40.0  1242  1.81  0.172  -95.6
Nigeria  110  6.7  50.0  1035  0.45  0.048  60.5
Malaysia  125  7.7  0.0  2070  3.00  0.181  -250.0
Indonesia  32  2.0  0.0  2070  3.00  0.046  -64.0
Oceania  30  1.8  0.0  2070  3.00  0.043  -60.0
Ecuador  85  5.2  0.0  2070  0.28  0.011  61.2
Brazil  329  20.1  20.0  1656  0.58  0.115  138.2
(a)  The non-zero  export tax rates are from Imran and Duncan, Table 7, page 21, and refer to 1982  and 1983  (for Brazil).
(b)  The long-nin elasticities  for Brazil, Cote d'lvoire, and Malaysia  were obtained  from Akiyama  and Bowers, page 25.  They apply  to
ten-year periods, using the highest  production  levels to obtain those values. We assume  that the elasticities  of Indonesia  and Oceania
are equal to that of Malaysia. The other elasticities  are from Behrman.
(e)  The slope is the change in metric  tons for a one US dollar change  in the domestic  producer  price.
19Table 2: InItal  Results with Actual Taxes and Free Trade
Tax  Output  Profitt
Rates  (OOOMT)  (Millions of US dollars)
________  ______  _  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Cote d'Ivoire  25.1  585  590  698  401
Ghana  70.0  219  454  405  404
Cameroon  40.0  118  171  138  86
Nigeria  50.0  110  134  202  152
Africa  1032  1349  1443  1043
Malaysia  0.0  125  33  43  3
Indonesia  0.0  32  8  11  .7
Oceania  0.0  30  7  11  .6
Ecuador  0.0  85  78  151  109
Brazil  20.0  329  318  523  356
World  _  1633  1793  2182  1512.3
World Price (U..  dollar-/MTD
Actual: 2,070
Free Trade: 1,562
'Profits are defined to include producers' surplus and govemnment  revenue.  Actual profits are
derived by assuming  that the calibrated demand and supply curves are tru demand and supply curves.
Trhese  profits will be different in general from actual observed profits (inclusive  of tax revenues).
20Table 3: Actual, Nash and Stackelberg  Equilibria
Initial  Results
ActIual:  A; Nash  Tax Game: Nash  (T); Nash  Quantity  Game:  Nash  (Q); Stackelberg  Quantity  Gamne:  S(Q)
Tax Rates  Output  Profit  fevue
(%)  (00 MT)  (millions  of USS)  (millions  of USS)
Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash
A  |(T)  (Q)  S(Q)  A  m  (Q)  S(Q)  A  (T)  (Q)  S(Q)  A  (1)  (Q)  |(Q)
Country  (a)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Colc  dl'v.  25.1  25.2  52.7  29.5  585  490  371  539  698  496  595  659  304  220  436  324
Ghana  70.0  195  49.3  49.7  219  421  347  321  405  493  614  523  318  146  382  2  326
Canmono  40.0  8.2  26.4  25.6  a18  184  186  165  138  125  210  165  98  27  109  F  6
Nigeria  50.0  5.7  20.5  |  21-.  110  139  144  136  202  182  247  218  114  14  66  59
ArFFa  F  -1032  1234  1048  1161  1443  1296 1666  1565  834  407  993  795
Malaysin  0.0  2.8  13.9  11.9  125  63  98  76  43  14  57  35  0  3.2  30  19
Indonesia  0.0  0.7  4.8  4.1  32  17  34  26  1  1  3.4  16  10  0  .2  3.6  2.2  1
Oceania  0.0  0.6  4.5  3.8  30  16  32  25  11  3.2  15  9  0  .2  3.2  19t
Ecuador  0.0  3.2  11.8  12.6  85  80  83  81  151  126  164  148  0  4.6  22  20.7
Brazil  20.0  13.4  41.1  42.4  329  315  289  274  523  424  547  480  136  75  266  237
World  _  1633  1725  184  1643  2182  1866.6  2465  2247  970  49.2  1317.8  1075.8
World  Price  (U.S. Dollars/MT)
Actual  =  2,070
Nash  (  =  1,779
Nash  (Q) =  2,233
S (Q)  =  2,046
21Table 4:  Effects  of Increasig Ghana's latemcet by W10,MoMT  at V2rikus Equillbria
Actual: A; Nash  Tax Game:  Nash  (T); Nash Quantity  Game: Nash  (Q)
Tax Rates  Output  Profit  Revenuc
_  _  _)  (O00  MT)  (millions  of US$)  (mllions of USS)
Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nswh
A  (1)  (Q)  A  ('F)  (Q)  A  (')  (Q)  A  Cl)  (Q)
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Cote  d-lv.  25.1  25.3  52.6  560  470  361  642  460  565  280  205  414
Ghana  70.0  23.5  57.5  313  492  395  579  631  755  437  200  496
Cameroon  40.0  8.1  26.2  109  175  180  121  114  197  87  24  103
Nigeria  50.0  5.8  20.6  107  137  142  191  173  239  107  14  64
Afra  1089  1274  1078  1533  1378  1756  911  443  1o77
Malaysia  0  2.5  13.4  1  1  53  92  34  10  50  0  2.3  27
Indonesia  0  0.6  4.6  28  15  32  8.3  2.5  14  0  .2  3.2
Oceania  0  0.6  4.3  26  14  30  7.7  2.3  13  0  .1  28
Ecuador  0  3.3  12.0  83  79  82  144  122  159  0  4.6  22
Brazil  20.0  13.7  41.5  322  309  285  495  405  528  128  73  258
Worldl  1659  1744  1599  222  2520  1039  523.2  1390
World Price (U.S. Dollars/MT)
Actual  =  1,993
Nash(T) =  1,722
Nash (Q) =  2,182
22Table 5:  Effeces  of Increasing Malaysia's Intermept  by 100,OOOMT  at Various Equilibria
Actual: A; Nash  Tax Game: Nash (T); Nash Quantity  Game: Nash  (Q)
Tax Rates  Output  Profit  Revenue
_(%)  (a0m  MT)  (millions  of US$)  (millions  of USS)
Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash  Nash
A  m  (Q)  A  m)  (Q)  A  (1)  (Q)  A  m  (@
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Cole d'lv  25.1  25.2  52.6  560  470  360  642  457  561  280  203  411
Ghana  70.0  19.7  49.4  213  408  338  380  463  585  297  138  364
Cameroon  40.0  8.1  26.1  109  174  179  121  113  195  87  24  102
Nigenia  50.0  5.8  20.7  107  136  142  191  172  238  107  14  64
Africa  989  1188  1019  1334  1205  IS79  771  379  941
Malaysia  0  6.6  22.6  211  140  - 55  123  70  142  0  16  76
Indonesia  0  0.6  4.6  28  14  31  8.3  2.4  14  0  .1  3.1
Oceania  0  0.6  4.3  26  13  29  7.7  2.2  13  0  .1  2.8
Ecuador  0  3.3  12.0  83  79  82  144  121  159  0  4.5  21.5
Bazil  20.0  13.7  41.5  322  3  284  495  404  525  128  73  257
World  1659  1743  1600  2112  1804.6  2432  82.7  1301.4
World Price  (U.S. Dollars/MT)
Acual  =  1,993
Nash (r)  =  1,717
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